Designing of research coalitions in promoting GEOSS. A brief overview of the literature

Project Title: Designing of research coalitions in promoting GEOSS. A brief overview of the literature Collaborating GEO-BENE partners: BOKU (lead), IIASA


Despite of the common aim to implement GEOSS and provide better information for better decision making, the public good character of these national endeavours remains. Even though the national data and information contributed to GEOSS is nationally owned and hence excludable, the policies which are implemented due to the improved data concern the utilization and conservation of the environment and natural resources and are of public good character. Similar to a research coalition, contribution to GEOSS entails positive information spillovers on GEOSS-participants and non-participants alike, which reduces the incentive to contribute to the GEOSS platform and jeopardizes cooperation and the emergence of a socially optimal coalition. This discussion paper reviews literature of the game theoretic branch coalition theory with regards to the formation of research coalitions. The aim is not only to portray the process and challenge of research coalition formation, but also to introduce a set of incentives which could help to overcome the obstacle of spillovers and favour the formation of large and socially optimal coalitions.


Literature survey with focus on two stage non-cooperative, linear-quadratic Cournot games.


The results suggest that large coalitions clearly maximize social welfare and that the size of the coalition depends on the extent of information spillovers. Equilibrium coalitions are usually smaller than the optimal size coalition unless the spillover rate equals one and the involved countries are willing to fully share their data and information. This happens at a trade off for private benefits, which are decreasing for high spillover rates. The proposed incentive system to broaden participation to GEOSS includes the formation of multiple coalitions, which allows countries with specific interests (desertification, rain forests, marine ecosystem observations etc.) to flock together, and the linkage of negotiations, which compensates countries for their efforts to be part of the coalition.


This literature survey has been finished.